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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of student loans on students’ spending, earnings, and parental 
transfers. For causal identification, we exploit a nudge for the take-up of student loans. We estimate 
an instrumental variable (IV) model with a first-stage Difference-in-Differences design. We find 
that a decline in the default student loan reduced monthly student borrowing. A one-euro decline 
in student loans reduced students’ expenditures by 36 cents, but also led to a substantial increase 
of parental financial contributions (55 cents) and in-kind transfers (13 cents). Student loans 
substantially affect consumption behavior. Labor earnings are affected among vocational students, 
but not among university students. 
JEL codes: C31, D15, H52, I23, I28 
Keywords: Household finance, Default decisions, Debt behavior, Quasi-experiment, 
Intergenerational transfers, Consumption. 
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1 Introduction 
In many Western countries the demand for student loans has increased considerably (Lochner and 
Monge-Naranjo, 2015). That is because of the rising costs and returns to college, but also because 
of public spending cuts in response to the Great Recession. Whereas in the US the shift from grants 
to loans started already in the mid-1970s (Gross et al., 2009), governments in the UK and the 
Netherlands recently decided to replace student grants by student loans. As student loans are rising 
rapidly, it becomes increasingly important to understand the interaction between student borrowing 
and other financial decisions (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). More specifically, this paper 
studies the consequences of student loans on students’ spending, employment, and 
intergenerational transfers. In theory, 1) government programs may crowd out private transfers, 
and 2) private transfers may help to prevent moral hazard due to more intensive monitoring 
opportunities. We test these hypotheses in the context of student loans.  
Student loans may affect financial behavior of students now and in the future. The seminal work 
of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) argues that rational and forward-looking agents smooth 
consumption over the life-cycle. This suggests borrowing early in life, saving later in life, and 
dissaving in old age. However, private borrowing possibilities are often constrained (e.g. Cocco et 
al., 2005), especially early in life as a student (Carneiro & Heckman, 2002). Therefore, changes in 
early life borrowing constraints are likely to affect student labor supply and student spending 
behavior. They can also affect inter vivos intergenerational transfers from parents to their children, 
as parent can ease borrowing constraints (Cox, 1990) and compensate income (Hochguertel & 
Ohlsson, 2009) of their children.  
Early interest in student loans was primarily involved with testing the effectiveness of 
governmental student loan programs, to justify the magnitude of these programs. Literature based 
on quasi-randomized changes in policies suggests that student loan policies have large impacts on 
college enrollment  and college completion5, especially among low-income families (Linsenmeier 
et al., 2006; Belley & Lochner, 2007; Winter, 2014).6 Student loans, however, may also crowd out 
intergenerational transfers, in the same way as government transfers may crowd out private 
                                                            
5 Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 2003; Cornwell et al., 2006; Abraham & Clark, 2006; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; 
Johnson, 2013; Castleman & Long, 2016 and Ionescu & Simpson, 2016. Similar to student loans, parental transfers are important for college 
decisions (Keane & Wolpin, 2001). 
6 This is also confirmed by exogenous heterogeneity in tuition fees (Garibaldi et al., 2011). More generally, Dahl & Lochner (2012) find that parental 
income is important for children’s educational achievements.  
transfers.7 Therefore, changes in student loan policies may not only affect the students’ financial 
behavior but also the parents’ financial behavior.  
This paper investigates the causal effect of student loans on transfers that students receive from 
their parents. Furthermore, we analyze how student loans influence earnings, spending behavior 
and study results of students. In a quasi-experimental approach, we exploit an exogenous change 
in the take up of student loans in the Netherlands, stemming from a reform in 2009 that changed 
the default student loan from the government. Before 2009, students who started their fifth year 
automatically borrowed the maximum student loan from the government.8 As from 2009, the 
default student loan of students starting their fifth year was lowered to the former allowance plus 
the most recent loan. Using this period-cohort-based exogenous variation, we first estimate a 
Difference-in-Differences model and find that students let themselves be guided by the default 
student loan. The reduced default resulted in substantially lower student loans. Second, we use the 
exogenous reduction in the default student loan as an instrument to assess the causal effects of 
student loans on earnings, spending behavior, intergenerational transfers and study results. We thus 
estimate an instrumental variable (IV) model with a first-stage Difference-in-Differences design. 
We bring the model to the data using the ‘Student monitor’ survey, which contains detailed 
information about the financial situation of students and their parents. 
This study provides new evidence on financial behavior early in the life-cycle as well as on the 
degree to which student loans from the government are crowding out private inter vivos income 
transfers from parents to their children. Earlier evidence only exists for parental transfers in relation 
to bequests (McGarry, 1999; 2016; Poterba, 2001; Page, 2003; Joulfian, 2005) and the substitution 
between inter vivos parental transfers and children’s labor supply (Dustmann et al., 2009). The 
contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, as far as we know, we are the first to 
investigate the degree to which governmental student loans are crowding out financial support from 
parents (both in cash and in kind). This gives new insights into the role of inter vivos 
intergenerational transfers, which may help to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. Second, 
unique and detailed data allow us to analyze how student loans affect earnings and spending 
patterns of students (among which study-related expenses). Third, we evaluate the extent to which 
                                                            
7 E.g. Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1994; Cox et al. 1998; Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2002; Schoeni, 2002; Cox et al., 2004; Jensen, 2004; Reil-Held, 2006, 
Juarez, 2009. 
8 In this way the government aimed to prevent a negative income shock after depletion of the basic allowances after four year. 
debt behavior of individuals in higher education is rational. The reform that we investigate allows 
us to evaluate rational behavior without having to jointly identify heterogeneous preferences (such 
as risk and time preferences).9  
Our results confirm that family exchange is a fundamental economic issue (Altonji et al., 1997; 
Engelhardt & Mayer, 1998). Student loans crowd out financial support from parents. A one-euro 
reduction in student loan increases financial parental support with 55 cents. This increase is even 
higher (68 cents) when we also consider in-kind transfers from parents to their children. A one euro 
decline in student loan reduces student’s spending by 36 cents (of which 7 cents are study related 
spending). Especially housing and insurances are affected by student loans, but parents compensate 
this with in-kind transfers. Earnings are not affected significantly (in line with Wolff, 2006, and 
Kalenkoski & Pabilonia, 2010). Extended models show that responses are heterogeneous 
depending on students’ background, and that decreasing student loans do not have negative 
consequences for study outcomes. The substitution of student loans by parental transfers may have 
increased monitoring and pressure from parents on their student children to study more. Finally, an 
important lesson that can be drawn from this study is that debt behavior of individuals in higher 
education is irrational; early-life student loan decisions are highly subject to the default option.10 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting 
including some background on the Dutch study system and detailed information regarding the 
reform. Section 3 explains the methodology, after which Section 4 describes the data and presents 
summary statistics. Baseline estimation results, robustness checks, and heterogeneity analyses are 
shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Institutions 
2.2 Background 
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK and the US, the Dutch educational system 
largely consists of public universities. In this way, the government controls tuition fees with some 
limited bounds set by the universities. In contrast to, for example, Norway, tuition fees are not fully 
                                                            
9 Similarly, Gathergood et al. (2019) evaluate financial decisions by investigating credit card repayments. By investigating credit card repayment 
decisions, one can also check for optimal revealed behavior without the need to identify heterogeneous preferences.  
10 According to predictions from the standard life cycle model, individuals should not be influenced by defaults, as they are always assumed to act 
(optimally) in their own interests. In line with the behavioral life cycle hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), that builds forth on the seminal work 
of Kahneman & Tversky (1979), the results in this paper show that the default option does matter substantially. 
covered by the government. Tuition fees (around 2,000 euros per year), however, are lower than 
the actual costs, such that each student implicitly receives a subsidy. The highly public character 
of the educational system extends to the financing of tuition fees and daily-living expenses of 
students. 
The Netherlands has instituted a system in which students can borrow money from the government 
with relative ease and at a low interest rate (currently around 0.01%).11 Originally, this system of 
study loans was instituted for students coming from low income families in order to make studying 
available to people from all backgrounds. In 1986 the government extended the lending facilities 
to students of all socioeconomic backgrounds. As a consequence, public support in the form of 
loans and allowances became the main source of financial support for students, whereas 
dependence on private borrowing and grants is very low in the Netherlands.  
Until September 2015 financial support from the government consisted of allowances, loans (Table 
1) and a public transportation card.12 Allowances were higher for students that lived independently 
from their parents (about 64% of the students in our data). The basic allowance was received for 
four years and was given to the student without repayment if the student graduated within 10 years. 
If this condition was not met, the allowance had to be repaid like a regular loan. These conditions 
also applied to the public transportation card. For students whose parents’ income is below a certain 
threshold (total gross income below 46,000 euros per year), there was a supplementary allowance 
with the same conditions as the basic allowance. Students were only eligible for receiving 
allowances if they earned less than 13,989 euros in a year. Next to these allowances, students could 
receive a loan for tuition fees (165 euros per month) and borrow additional money up to about 300 
euros per month.  
As from September 2015 onwards (academic year 2015/2016), allowances are no longer part of 
the system and students can only apply for a loan for tuition fees and a regular loan. However, this 
new situation is not included in our research design as our data runs until 2015. In sum, the 
government is important in intervening in an imperfect credit market as well as in implicitly 
                                                            
11 See DUO: ‘Rentepercentages’ Retrieved from: https://duo.nl/apps/rentepercentage/index.html  
12 See DUO: ‘Het oude stelsel van studiefinanciering’. Retrieved from: https://duo.nl/particulier/student-hbo-of-universiteit/het-oude-stelsel-van-
studiefinanciering.jsp#  
subsidizing higher education in the Netherlands. With this strategy, the Dutch government strives 
to make higher education available to anyone regardless of socio-economic status. 
Table 1. Financial support from the government 
    
 
  
Living away 
from parents 
Living with parents 
 
   
Basic allowance 291 104 
Supplementary allowance1 275 253 
Maximum loan for tuition fees 165 165 
Maximum regular loan 302 302 
   
Total 1033 825 
      
1. Only for students whose parents’ total gross income is below 46,000 euros per year, 
although the maximum total income allowed for supplementary allowances increases 
depending on the number of children studying. 
 
2.2 Reforms in student loans 
During our period of analysis 2005-2015, the student loan system was subject to several changes. 
The reform that is subject of research in this paper is a reform that took place in 2009. Before 2009, 
as soon as one started the fifth year of studies, the government automatically converted the 
allowance into the maximum student loan, in order to prevent a sudden income loss. After the 
reform, the default study loan as from the fifth year of studies was lowered to the former allowance 
plus the most recent loan. Nonetheless, students could still easily opt for a maximum loan via the 
website of the public student loan administration (DUO).  
The change in the default study loan as from 2009 resulted in substantially lower student loans. 
This change in default gives exogenous variation in student loan claiming. The change in default 
student loan in 2009 is a matter of choice architecture rather than a borrowing constraint, since 
students can adjust the height of the student loan on a monthly basis by logging in at the DUO 
website. The persistent lower average student loan can therefore be attributed to a behavioral 
adjustment in response to the change in default. Descriptive evidence of Van der Steeg (2015) 
suggests that the change in defaults decreased the percentage of students with a maximum student 
loan from 68% to 11%. This paper studies the causal effects of this reform.  
Next to the change in the default study loan for fifth year students, other reforms were introduced 
in the period 2005-2015. In 2011, a fine was introduced for studying too long (‘langstudeerboete’). 
Retroactively, the fine also affected students studying too long in 2009 and 2010. Those students 
had to pay extra tuition fees over passed years. The fine was an increase in tuition fees of 3,063 
euros. Students could use the loan for tuition fees to pay this fine. ‘Too long’ was defined as the 
nominal period for the study plus one additional year. For example, students doing a three-year 
Bachelor’s degree program received a fine at the start of their fifth year. The fine for studying too 
long was already abolished in 2012 because of a large opposition from students. It is unlikely that 
this reform interferes with our analysis of the 2009-reform, since students could not be aware of 
the introduction of the fines in 2011. When we exclude the year 2011 from the analysis, the main 
conclusions do not change.  
In 2014, a minor change in the choice architecture of student loans was introduced. First-year’s 
student no longer saw the option “maximize student loan” when first-time applying for student 
loans. When we exclude those who were enrolled for less than 12 months or those who stated they 
are first year students in their program, the results are very similar.  
Finally, it should be noted that we take into account policies at the national level, but we abstract 
from university-, faculty-, and study-specific changes. However, it is unlikely that such changes 
interfere with the 2009-reform unless the policy changes are specifically targeted at fifth year 
students versus first to fourth year students in 2009.  
3 Method 
This study exploits the 2009-reform, described in Section 2.2. First, in Section 3.1, we investigate 
the effect of the decline in the default student loan on actual student loan debt. Second, we use the 
exogenous variation in student loan debt to analyze the causal effect of student loans on 
intergenerational transfers, employment and spending patterns (Section 3.2).  
 
 
3.1 Student loan claiming 
To analyze the causal effect of a decline in the default student loan on actual student loan debts we 
use a Difference-in-Differences (DD) approach. The treated group in our DD approach consists of 
all students between the ages of 23 and 27 years who no longer receive a basic allowance and, 
hence, enter their fifth academic year. The control group consists of students between 21 and 27 
with a basic allowance. That are those who are first, second, third, or fourth year students. The 
treatment period starts in the academic year 2009/2010. Students receive the allowance for four 
years, which means most students enter the borrowing phase in their fifth year, mostly at the age 
of 23. For a graphical representation of the age-academic year combinations in the treatment group, 
we refer to Table A1 in the Appendix.  
We estimate 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝜇 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (1) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the amount of student loan debt held by individual i in period t. 𝛼0 is the intercept and 
𝛼𝑡 a set of year fixed effects. G equals 1 for the treated group and 0 for the control group, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 is 
a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is in the treatment group during the treatment 
period, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables with coefficients 𝜇. We assume the error term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 to 
follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝐿
2. The control variables are age, sex, 
immigrant, university, and field of study dummies. The coefficient of primary interest is the 
treatment effect (𝛾). If this coefficient is not significantly different from zero, we conclude that 
students are not sensitive to the changed default in student loans and, hence, behave rationally. If 
𝛾 is significantly negative we conclude that students are responsive to default setting in student 
loans and, hence, do not behave according to a rational agent.  
The parallel trend assumption is crucial in DD analyses. To test this assumption, we describe trends 
in the treatment and control group before the change in the default student loan.13 Furthermore, we 
test the parallel trends assumption using placebos in the empirical analysis. 
 
                                                            
13 The descriptive statistics in section 4 show that the parallel trend assumption is likely to hold, as pre-treatment trends are fairly similar for the 
treatment and the control group. 
3.2 Earnings, spending, and parental contributions 
We investigate how student loans affect earnings, consumption spending, and parental transfers. 
Estimating the effect of student loans on such behavior using OLS, however, would lead to biased 
results because of possible endogeneity. For example, debt aversion of parents may influence both 
parental contributions and student loan take-up (third factor), and earnings may lower student loans 
(reverse causality). We use an instrumental variable to address the issue of endogeneity. As an 
instrument we use the reform described in Section 2.2, as it is likely to explain student loans claims 
(relevant instrument), but does not affect earnings, spending, and parental contribution decisions 
other than through student loans (valid instrument). We estimate equation (1) simultaneously with 
equations (2), (3) and (4)   
𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑇0+𝜃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑇𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝜑𝑇𝑋 + 𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑡  (2) 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝐸0+𝜃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝜑𝐸𝑋 + 𝑢𝐸𝑖𝑡  (3)  
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝐶0+𝜃𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝜑𝐶𝑋 + 𝑢𝐶𝑖𝑡  (4) 
Where 𝑇𝑖𝑡 represents the parental contribution received by student i in period t, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 are the earnings, 
and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 consumption spending of student i in period t. 𝜃𝑇0, 𝜃𝐸0 and 𝜃𝐶0 are the intercepts, and 
𝜃𝑇𝑡 , 𝜃𝐸𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 represent year fixed effects. The error terms 𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝐸𝑖𝑡, and 𝑢𝐶𝑖𝑡 together with 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variances 𝜎𝐸
2, 𝜎𝐶
2, and 
𝜎𝑇
2 for earnings, consumption, and parental transfers, respectively.  
We are particularly interested in the coefficients 𝛿𝑇, 𝛿𝐸 , and 𝛿𝐶, which measure the response in 
parental transfers, earnings, and consumption spending, respectively, to a one euro change in 
student loan. For example, 𝛿𝑇 = 1 would suggest full substitution between student loans and 
parental transfers. 𝛿𝑇 between zero and one would suggest partial substitution between student 
loans and parental transfers. The coefficients 𝛿𝐸 , 𝛿𝐶 ,  𝛿𝑇 are identified by the policy reform modeled 
in Equation (1). In addition to the baseline estimates, we decompose 𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 into several 
categories, such as cash and in-kind transfers from parents to their children, and students’ spending 
on housing, leisure, and study materials. Furthermore, we show results for extended five-equation 
models, in which we analyze the effects of student loans on students’ study performance.   
The models in this paper are estimated with Maximum Likelihood. We also estimated the models 
using 2SLS and 3SLS. 2SLS is consistent under a broader class of error distributions (but less 
efficient if the error terms are normal), 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS. All estimations lead to 
very similar results (available from the authors upon request).   
4 Data 
4.1 Student monitor 
To analyze the effect of student loans on financial behavior, earnings, and parental contribution of 
students we use the Student Monitor for Higher Education 2005-2015 (in Dutch: 
“Studentenmonitor”).14 This is a yearly online survey that is fielded at the request of the Ministry 
of Education, Culture and Science by ResearchNed. It was initiated in 2000 in light of the 
Eurostudent Project which aims to keep track of socioeconomic traits of students.15 In 2010, the 
survey was not fielded. The survey covers around 15 topics but the most relevant ones for this 
research include: current education, study progress, personal traits, socioeconomic background, 
characteristics of parents, income and expenses, earnings, and time allocation. Topics and questions 
have been subject to some changes over the years due to changes in the college system and student 
loan system. The most prominent change was due to the introduction of the Bachelor-Master 
structure in higher education in 2002. Although the survey provides many detailed subcategories 
of income and consumption it should be noted that values are self-reported. It is trustworthy that 
the average total consumption spending that is reported in our data is fairly comparable to the 
average reported expenditures reported by Nibud (2015), based on a different survey.  
Data collection takes place yearly around spring (May/June). Students are selected based on 
stratified sample selection. The data set runs from 2001 to 2015, totaling a number of 186,665 
respondents. The response rate varies substantially by year but is at least 26% and at most 50%. 
According to ResearchNed, the size of the response is sufficiently reliable to draw generalized 
conclusions for the Dutch student population. For comparison of treatment and control groups we 
disregard the first four years, and select all students in the years 2005-2015, which gives us a sample 
of 80,498 students.16  
                                                            
14 See http://www.studentenmonitor.nl/over/over1.htm 
15 See http://www.eurostudent.eu/about/intentions  
16 Because of some item nonresponse, the regression analysis contains 77,722 students.  
4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2 describes the composition of the sample. As expected, the average age is higher in the 
treatment group than in the control group. The last column shows that trends, however, are quite 
similar in the treatment and control group. For example, the percentage of males and university 
students declined both in the treatment and the control group. The percentage of economics 
students increased in the control group, but not in the treatment group. We control for this 
differential trend in the analysis (all variables in panel A will be included as control variables in 
the models). 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the dependent variables by control period, treatment period, 
control group, and treatment group. This allows us to do a simple Difference-in-Differences 
analysis (DD) for the dependent variables. The simple DD suggests that student loans decreased 
by about 139 euros per month because of the reform. As a consequence of the lower student loan, 
students spent about 38 euros per month less (largely due to housing and living), earned about 14 
euro per month more, and received about 62 euros per month more from their parents (47 euros 
cash and 15 euros in-kind). So, according to this descriptive evidence, about one third of the decline 
in student loans is substituted by parental contributions. Descriptive evidence shows that student 
loans are an important source of income for our treatment group prior to the reform, together with 
parental transfers and labor earnings (see Figures A1-A2 in the Appendix).  
The crucial assumption in the identification of the DD is the Parallel Trend Assumption, i.e. the 
treatment group and control group should follow the same trend in absence of the treatment. Since 
the counterfactual is not observed we can analyze the trends of both groups prior to the reform. In 
Figure 1 we present graphical evidence on the Parallel Trend Assumption. Although students in 
the treatment group have substantially higher student loans, trends are fairly similar. Both groups 
face an upward trend from 2006 to 2008 and a plateau around 2008/2009.17 Figure 1 shows that it 
is important to take into account period effects. After 2009, we see a small decline in student loans 
also in the control group, which could be due to the crisis and general pessimism. For the 
development of student earnings, spending, and parental contributions over 2005-2015 we refer to 
Figures A3-A6 in the Appendix. 
                                                            
17 Section 5.2 provides more formal evidence on the Parallel Trend Assumption. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of characteristics by treatment and control group. 
                    
 Control period Treatment period DD 
 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
  
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.   
 
           
Control variables 
           
Age 22.94 2.15 24.75 1.26 22.69 2.11 24.39 1.17 -0.11 
Male (0-1) 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.00 
Immigrant (0-1) 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.03 
University (0-1)a 0.64 0.48 0.84 0.37 0.56 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.01 
Science (0-1) 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.04 
Social science (0-1) 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.10 -0.01 
Medical (0-1) 0.17 0.37 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.30 0.00 
Economics (0-1) 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37 -0.05 
Law (0-1) 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.01 
Agriculture (0-1) 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.02 
Education (0-1) 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.00 
Interdisciplinary (0-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.00 
                     
a When university is zero, the student is in higher vocational education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of dependent variables by treatment and control group. 
                    
 Control period Treatment period DD 
 
Control group 
Treatment 
group 
Control group 
Treatment 
group 
  
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.   
            
Dependent variables (euros/m) 
           
Student loan 129.98 211.23 360.76 350.76 100.28 182.48 192.34 278.31 -138.72 
Spending 
           
-          Total 857.60 540.42 957.24 454.14 627.57 357.53 689.71 383.21 -37.50 
-        Housing 220.52 276.48 243.72 217.86 211.71 186.79 220.10 193.03 -14.81 
-          Living 246.75 213.91 282.84 192.15 118.49 92.25 136.67 100.11 -17.91 
-          Clothing 105.45 262.18 103.71 218.83 40.92 44.94 46.19 47.95 7.01 
-          Leisure 81.18 88.48 92.07 85.45 54.98 49.24 59.97 53.61 -5.90 
-          Cellphone 35.17 42.06 36.32 35.23 23.99 17.04 24.93 17.68 -0.21 
-          Commuting 25.28 50.94 26.79 48.51 20.62 36.21 31.32 45.45 9.19 
-          Other 30.65 63.89 35.65 65.55 39.93 54.08 40.44 58.63 -4.49 
-          Tuition 56.87 62.69 64.18 62.77 73.14 78.32 75.99 78.70 -4.46 
-          Study materials 28.64 21.17 27.86 21.25 17.09 20.94 14.91 18.79 -1.40 
-          Insurances 58.98 46.57 63.97 46.21 20.36 39.02 25.44 43.70 0.09 
-          Other large 73.57 76.38 83.84 83.03 43.31 55.00 41.75 57.85 -11.83 
Earnings 244.78 315.03 324.47 360.35 202.32 246.17 295.94 344.07 13.93 
Parental contributions            
-          In-cash 129.37 172.07 149.25 198.49 129.84 174.32 196.71 245.76 46.99 
-          In-kind 
           
                   -        Total 411.28 161.46 427.88 166.85 251.74 285.18 283.66 322.94 15.32 
                   -        Housing 163.72 119.53 161.44 121.78 91.07 179.57 117.31 198.15 28.52 
                   -        Living 35.11 35.03 34.13 32.57 30.53 76.07 35.05 80.26 5.50 
                   -        Tuition 121.48 19.60 120.99 20.63 73.28 77.22 66.59 79.43 -6.20 
                   -        Study mat. 28.19 21.18 23.59 18.77 8.06 17.51 4.87 13.29 1.41 
                   -        Insurances 51.70 36.43 51.49 36.48 11.61 30.27 12.79 31.92 1.39 
                   -        Other large 64.36 52.55 68.80 56.77 6.73 26.27 6.87 29.88 -4.30 
            
Observations 18,015 6,137 35,533 6,895   
                     
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average student loans for the treatment and control group over 2003-2015 (euros per 
month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. 
 
5 Estimation results 
5.1 Baseline results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. We find that the change in the student loan default, highly 
relevant as an instrumental variable according to its F-statistic, reduced student loans on average 
by 81 euros per month. This may be explained by students procrastinating on changing the default 
(in the new and/or in the old situation), a status quo bias, or because students just considered the 
default option the right thing to do (implicit advice).  
Students’ parental contributions increased by 55 eurocents for each euro reduction in student loan. 
Hence, students received about 45 euros per month more from their parents (81 x 0.55). We do not 
find such substitution effects between student loans and student earnings. Students spending, 
however, decreased; for each euro decline in student loans, students reduced their consumption 
spending by 36 eurocents. On average, the decline in student loans implied a decline of 29 euros 
of spending (81 x 0.36). 
Next, in Table 5, parental contributions do not only include in-cash transfers, but also include 
consumption spending directly paid by the parents. Including such in-kind transfers increases the 
substitution between student loans and parental contribution from 0.55 to 0.68. Hence, taking into 
account in-kind parental transfers shows that on average about 2/3 of the reduction in student loans 
is replaced by parental contributions. Due to the decrease in student loans, total parental transfers 
increased by 55 euros per month (81 x 0.68). 
5.2 Robustness of the Difference-in-Differences 
To check the robustness of the results we conduct 1) a placebo test (to check the parallel trend 
assumption), and 2) we change the age-window. We test the parallel trend assumption by estimating 
a ‘placebo-treatment’ for the years prior to the actual treatment. That is, we compare academic 
years 2005/2007 (control period) and 2008/2009 (“treatment” period) in the baseline regression, as 
if the default already changed in the academic year 2008/2009. The coefficient of this placebo is 
much smaller than in the baseline regression (14.64 instead of -80.61), and is not significant (p-
value of 0.17). Therefore, we conclude that the parallel trend assumption holds.  
Estimation results also hold when we narrow the sample to students aged 22-23, to make sure that 
treatment and control groups are more comparable. These students are right around the cutoff age 
as explained in Section 3.1. Estimated coefficients are highly similar to the estimated coefficients 
in the baseline regression (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Hence, conclusions are robust to using 
a smaller age-window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation results of the Simultaneous Equation Model.  
                          
 
Student loan 
Parental transfers  
(in-cash)  
Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
             
Student loan (δT, δE, and δC)    -0.55 *** 0.05 -0.08  0.07 0.36 *** 0.11 
             
Change in default (γ) -80.61 *** 4.05          
                          
Observations 77,722   77,722   77,722   77,722   
F-stat. excl. instrument 396.81            
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, 
university, group that is subject to the change in default, and field of study dummies. Extended estimation results, including the correlation matrix of the error terms, can be found in the 
appendix (Table A.2).   
 
Table 5. Estimation results of the Simultaneous Equation Model including in-kind transfers from parents.  
                          
 
Student loan 
Parental transfers  
(in-cash + in-kind) 
Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
             
Student loan (δT, δE, and δC)    -0.68 *** 0.13 -0.08  0.07 0.38 *** 0.11 
             
Change in default (γ) -80.61 *** 4.05          
                          
Observations 77,722   77,722   77,722   77,722   
F-stat. excl. instrument 396.81            
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, 
university, group that is subject to the change in default, and field of study dummies.    
  
5.3 Heterogeneous effects 
Responses to the changed default may be heterogeneous, for example because of difference in 
financial literacy. Therefore, in Table 6 we investigate heterogeneous effects for education level 
(university students vs. higher vocational education students), and for students studying in different 
fields. As the change in default is merely a matter of choice architecture, it might be that more 
rational agents are less prone to change their behavior. For this matter, we focus on economics 
students, who are trained with rational agent models, and science students (beta-studies such as 
physics, math, chemistry, etc.), who are perhaps also more likely to behave rationally due to their 
training in more math-dependent programs.  
The estimation results suggest that university students (Panel A) are significantly less responsive 
to the change in default: they respond by decreasing student loans by about 44 euros less than 
students with higher vocational education.18 University students are less likely to increase earnings 
and decrease spending after a decline in student loan. However, they receive more parental transfers 
for compensation.19 Despite their better knowledge of rational behavior and financial decision-
making, economics and science students (Panel B) respond not significantly different to the change 
in the default as students from other disciplines. Student loans decrease by about 84 euros due to 
the reform. As a result of lower student loans, economics students especially reduce their spending 
substantially more (about a third more than non-economics students). They also receive slightly 
less compensation from their parents. However, for science students we find no significant 
differences compared to non-economics students.  
In politics and in the literature much emphasis has been placed on the accessibility of higher 
education. Therefore, in Table 7 we analyze whether students with low- and high-income parents 
respond differently. More specifically, we estimate heterogeneous responses for students whose 
parents earn a relatively high or relatively low income. Parental income is reported by the students 
and measured by five net income brackets. When interpreting the results, we have to take into 
account that there could be some measurement error correlated with parental transfers. When 
students whose parents do not compensate for reductions in student loans underestimate their 
                                                            
18 Prior to the reform, the average student loan of the treatment group of university students was 329 euro per month. This was slightly higher for 
vocational education students with 345 euros per month. The difference is only significant at the 10 percent-level (p = 0.08).  
19 This also holds when we consider both in-cash and in-kind transfers, which may be important as students of vocational education are more likely 
to live together with their parents. The estimated parameters are -0.69 for “Student loan” and -0.08 for “Student loan · University”, respectively 
(both have a p-value of 0.00, not reported here). 
parents’ income, our estimate is biased upward. The estimation results show that students with low 
income parents (lower than 1,400 euros net per month, 10.17% of the data) or high income parents 
(higher than 3,499 euros per month, 43.81% of the data), do not respond significantly different to 
the change in the default than students with middle income parents. Neither do we find a significant 
difference between students with high- and low-income parents. Also, with regard to earnings and 
consumption spending there are no significant differences. Although we observe that students with 
high-income parents receive on average about 100 euros per month more compared to students 
without high-income parents, parents do not react differently to changes in student loans.  
Another specific group that is underrepresented in higher education are migrants. Our data show 
that students with a migration background are remarkably overrepresented in study areas that are 
likely to generate a high return to their education. We observe that immigrant students are less than 
9% of the respondents in the data, but these students represent about 14% and 12%, in law and 
economics, respectively. For comparison, only less slightly than 8%, 5%, 4% of immigrant students 
enroll in arts, agricultural, and educational studies respectively.20 This may suggest that the return 
to education is more important to immigrant students, to be able to pay back their monetary 
investment of studying. The immigrant students in our sample (Panel B) respond nearly twice as 
strong to the reform than non-immigrant students. Nonetheless, they do not decrease spending 
significantly more than non-immigrant students and responses in earnings are slightly bigger.21 
Parental compensations are slightly higher for immigrant students than for non-immigrant students. 
All conclusions from Table 7 are robust to using both in-cash and in-kind transfers from parents.   
                                                            
20 The percentage of immigrant students in medicine, sciences, and social sciences are highly comparable to the average of 8% in the data. 
21 However, the sum of coefficients of the effects of student loans on earnings is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.31). 
Table 6. Heterogeneous effects with respect to education level and field of study. 
                          
 
Student loan 
Parental transfers  
(in-cash) 
Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
A.       University                         
Student loan    -0.45 *** 0.05 -0.17 ** 0.07 0.54 *** 0.10 
             
Student loan · 
University    
-0.07 *** 0.01 0.06 *** 0.01 -0.12 *** 0.02 
             
Change in default -114.87 *** 8.35          
             
Default · University 43.80 *** 8.90          
             
B.       Economics/Science            
Student loan    -0.48 *** 0.04 -0.08 
 0.07 0.34 *** 0.10 
             
Student loan · Econ    0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 ** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.02 
             
Student loan · Science    -0.01 
 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.02 
             
Change in default -83.83 *** 4.90          
             
Default · Econ -3.57  10.27          
             
Default · Science 7.89  8.90          
                          
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change in default,  
and field of study dummies. Errors are allowed to be correlated.  
Table 7. Heterogeneous effects with respect to parental income and immigrant status 
                          
 Student loan Parental transfers Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
             
A. Parental income             
Student loan    -0.54 *** 0.12 0.61 *** 0.20 0.30  0.30 
 
            
Student loan · 1(Income < 1,400)   0.00  0.02 -0.01  0.04 -0.01  0.06 
 
            
Student loan · 1(Income > 3,499)   -0.01  0.01 0.02  0.02 0.00  0.04 
 
            
Change in default -64.12 *** 17.08          
 
            
Default · 1(Income < 1,400) 1.02  36.75          
             
Default · 1(Income > 3,499) -28.15  23.16          
             
B.      Immigrants             
Student loan    -0.50 *** 0.04 0.03  0.06 0.52 *** 0.09 
             
Student loan · 
Immigrant    
-0.02 * 0.01 0.03 ** 0.02 0.02 
 
0.02 
             
Change in default -76.89 *** 4.05          
             
Default · Immigrant -60.71 *** 12.39          
                          
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change in default,  
and field of study dummies. Errors are allowed to be correlated.  
5.4 Spending categories 
Table 8 breaks down the total amount of spending into several consumption spending categories: 
housing, living, clothing, leisure, cellphone, commuting, tuition fees, study material, insurances 
(ex. health insurance), and other large expenses. The data include information on in-kind parental 
transfers in all consumption categories, except for clothing, leisure, cellphone, commuting, and 
other expenses. This means that we have information regarding students’ and students’ parental 
spending on the most substantial spending categories Total spending (both by the students and 
directly paid by their parents) from the baseline regressions is based on the pre-constructed variable 
in the data that asks respondents to sum total spending to the monthly level.22 In Table A4 we show 
that estimation results are highly robust to different definitions of spending, regardless of the in- or 
exclusion of in-kind parental transfers and yearly spending categories. The first row in the table 
show that including in-kind parental spending does not affect our conclusions. The second row of 
estimates shows that total spending decreases with lower student loans, even if in-kind transfers 
from parents (which increase due to the cut in student loans) are taken into account. The third row 
shows that conclusions are robust to including both monthly and yearly spending categories. 
In Table 8, we re-estimate Equation (2) for each of the consumption spending categories available 
in the data. The left columns present the average change in students’ spending as response to a one 
euro change in student loan. The right columns present the average change in spending directly 
paid by students’ parents (in-kind transfers).  
Table 8 indicates that student loans influence spending patterns of students. More particularly, we 
observe that a decrease in student loans of one euro decreases monthly spending on housing, living, 
and other monthly expenses by 16, 9, and 5 eurocents, respectively. Interestingly, we do not observe 
changes in spending categories that are most likely to be luxury-goods such as leisure, clothing, 
and cellphone. Commuting expenses increase by 9 eurocents which could be a consequence of 
moving to cheaper housing that is further from the place of study.23 We also observe that a reduction 
in student loans of one euro decreases yearly spending on tuition fees, insurances, and other large 
                                                            
22 The different categories do not perfectly add up to the total spending used in the baseline specification due to the fact that we have no information 
on all spending categories in all survey and because of the set-up of the data set. Total spending is asked as a monthly average. Spending categories 
can either be asked as a monthly average or an annual average (see Table 8). In the case of an annual average we normalize the spending category 
to a monthly average by dividing the annual amount by 12.  
23 We find a negative coefficient for student loan on commuting time, indicating that a reduction in student loan increases commuting time. 
However, this coefficient is not significant (not reported here).  
expenses by 5, 6, and 10 eurocents, respectively. Small decreases in study materials and other 
study-related spending due to the cut in student loans are also observed but only marginal. We 
cannot rule out that cuts in student loans partially go at the cost of sources necessary for studying, 
although most substantial changes are related to housing, living, and insurances.  
The parental in-kind transfers in Table 8 show that parents start paying part of the consumption 
expenses of their student children next to increasing their in-cash transfers. Monthly housing costs 
paid by the parents increase by 35 eurocents for a one-euro decline in student loan. Also, yearly 
insurances paid by the parents increase by 2 eurocents. Hence, decreases in student loans not only 
result in changing consumption patterns of students but it also has consequences for consumption 
patterns of parents who, next to in-cash inter vivos transfers, start paying parts of the students’ 
consumption categories. Especially, expenses related to housing and insurances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Effect of student loan on several consumption spending categories, paid by students and 
parents.  
        
 Paid by student Paid by parents 
Dependent variables  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
 Monthly spending (euros) 
       
Housing 0.16 *** 0.06 -0.35 *** 0.06 
       
Living 0.09 ** 0.04 -0.02  0.02 
       
Clothing -0.06  0.09 n/a  n/a 
       
Leisure 0.03  0.02 n/a  n/a 
       
Cellphone -0.01  0.01 n/a  n/a 
       
Commuting -0.09 *** 0.01 n/a  n/a 
       
Other expenditures 0.05 *** 0.02 n/a  n/a 
       
 Yearly spending normalized to monthly (euros) 
       
Tuition fee 0.05 *** 0.02 -0.03  0.02 
 
      
Study material 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00  0.01 
 
      
Insurances (ex. health 
insurance) 
0.06 *** 0.01 -0.02 ** 0.01 
       
Other large expenditures 0.10 *** 0.02 0.02 * 0.01 
              
 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.  
Earnings and parental transfers are not reported here.  Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change 
in default, and field of study dummies. Living paid by parents includes clothing. We omitted expenditures on children as this category is only 
important to a few students. 
 
5.5 Study results 
Bachmann & Boes (2014), based on an IV-estimation with lagged private transfers, suggest that 
when students receive more private transfers, they shift their allocation of time from working to 
studying. This might improve their study results as suggested by the evidence from Kalenkoski & 
Pabilonia (2010). In the previous sections, we found that a reduction in student loans increased 
private transfers from parents, but had no overall effect on student earnings. This probably implies 
that the number of working hours of the students stayed the same. However, due to the substitution 
of student loans by private transfers, moral hazard may decline. Student may feel more pressure 
from their parents to spent time on their study and this may positively affect study results. In this 
section we extend the baseline model (equations (1)-(4)). The baseline model defines a four-
equation model. Table 9 presents estimation results for a five-equation model where we include 
additional equations for study achievements (time studying, self-reported duration of studying 
since starting their studies, self-reported average grades, and self-reported probability to achieve 
the final degree of the study program).  
 The coefficient of the effect of student loan on time studying suggests that a one-euro decrease in 
student loans increases time studying by about half a minute per week (60 x 0.0076). Thus, for the 
average decrease of 80 euros that we find after the decline in the default student loan, student 
increase time studying by about 40 minutes per week (80 x 0.5). Similarly, we find that a one-euro 
decline in student loans decreases the duration of studies by about one day (30 x 0.03). So, the 
decline in the default student loan induced students to be about 80 days faster completing their 
studies, on average (80 x 1). The faster pace of studying induced by the reform does not go at the 
cost of study grades. We find that a one-euro decrease in student loans increases students’ GPA by 
0.0006 on a 1-10 scale which is an average increase of the GPA by 0.05 (80 x 0.0006). Hence, 
decreasing student loans might well increase the pace of studying while it is likely not to go at the 
cost of study grades. The self-reported probability to achieve the final degree of the study program 
is not significantly influenced by the amount of student loan.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Effect of student loan on study results. 
  
   
 
Study results 
  
Dependent variables  Coeff.   S.E. 
 
Time studying (h/w)(/100)24 -0.76 ** 0.33 
 
   
Duration (months) 0.03 *** 0.01 
    
GPA (1-10)(/100) -0.06 *** 0.02 
    
Subjective probability diploma (1-11)25 0.00 
 
0.00 
        
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change in default,  
and field of study dummies.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In a variety of contexts, it is known that government programs crowd out private transfers (Cox, 
1987). For example, public pensions reduce private transfers from children to their parents (Jensen, 
2004, Jung et al 2016) and welfare programs reduce private transfers (Albarran and Antanassio, 
2003). As far as we know, this study is the first to quantify the effect of governmental student loans 
on private parental transfers. Student loans have an important impact on people’s lives. We analyze 
the causal effect of student loans on inter vivos intergenerational financial support, student spending 
and student earnings. In addition, according to the theory, private transfers may reduce moral 
hazard due to increased monitoring opportunities. We test this hypothesis with estimations on study 
results.  
To be able to estimate causal effects, we exploit a decline in the default governmental student loan 
for fifth year students. This policy became effective at the start of the academic year 2009/2010. 
                                                            
24 Time studying includes both contact hours and hours of self-studying.  
25 “What probability do you give yourself to achieve the final degree of your educational program?” The data set organizes the answer to this question 
in to 11 categories: (0 thru 4=0) (5 thru 14=10) (15 thru 24=20) (25 thru 34=30) (35 thru 44=40) (45 thru 54=50) (55 thru 64=60) (65 thru 74=70) 
(75 thru 84=80) (85 thru 94=90) (95 thru 100=100). 
Therefore, we can define a group that is subject to the change and a group that is not affected by 
the reform depending on age and academic year. Data are taken from the Student Monitor 2005-
2015, which contains detailed information on the financial situation and decisions of students and 
their parents. 
First, we estimate the effect of the decline in the default student loan on the actual uptake of student 
loans using a Difference-in-Differences approach. Second, we use the exogenous variation in 
student loans, arisen from the decline in the default student loan, to identify the degree to which 
student loans are crowding out private inter vivos income transfers from parents to their children. 
We estimate an instrumental variable (IV) model with the Difference-in-Differences design in the 
first-stage. By using the Difference-in-Difference design in the first stage, we take into account 
period effects that coincide with the decline in the default student loan. 
Although rational behavior predicts that default options should not influence the outcome, we find 
that the average student loan is reduced on average by 81 euros per month. Students let themselves 
be guided by the default student loan and according to the behavioral economics literature this can 
be explained by students procrastinating on changing the default, a status quo bias, or because 
students infer the default as an implicit recommendation.  
The results show that inter vivos intergenerational financial support contributes significantly in 
smoothing consumption at the early stage of the life-cycle. A one euro decline in student loan 
increases parental support with 55 cents. This increase is even higher (68 cents) when we also take 
into account in-kind transfers from parents. This evidence contributes to the debate about private 
transfer motives and suggests that altruistic motives play a key role. That is because in case the 
exchange motive would dominate, public transfers need not crowd out private ones (Cox, 1992).  
Using the same methodology, we also investigate the effect of student loans on spending and 
earnings. While a one-euro decline in student loans decrease expenditures in housing and 
insurances in particular, increased parental in-kind transfers compensate in these categories. 
Although the consequences for expenditures on study resources are small, we cannot rule out that 
cuts in student loans have an effect on the money spend on study resources. Overall, student 
earnings are not significantly affected by changes in student loans, but we do find that higher 
vocational students increase their earnings about 15 cents for every one-euro decline in student 
loans.   
Although conclusions are robust to a variety of specifications, we find substantial heterogeneity in 
responses to the change in student loan default. Heterogeneity largely depends on the background 
of the study with economics students being more responsive. We find no evidence for heterogeneity 
between students with high and low-income parents. This suggests that the change in the default 
student loan had a large impact on low-income families. Extended models also show that student 
loans affect study results. Interestingly, decreasing study loans increases the pace of studying and 
increase average study grades. This may be due to the increased monitoring of parents, when 
student loans are mostly substituted by parental transfers.  
For policy implications it is important to conclude that 1) debt behavior of students in higher 
education is irrational; the behavior is highly responsive to changing defaults in borrowing 
facilities, 2) government intervention in imperfect credit markets, in order to allow students to 
study, do not only affect the finances of students but even more so the finances of their parents 
(who seem to have altruistic motives to provide financial support). Finally, lower student loans 
increased study results, which may be due to increased monitoring of parents who increased their 
private transfers and reduced moral hazard.  
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Appendix. Additional Tables and Figures 
The treatment group is defined as all students between 23 and 27 years old who no longer receive 
a basic allowance after 2010. Students are eligible for the basic allowance from the age of 18 and 
receive the allowance for four years. 18 + 4 = 22, which means most students enter the borrowing 
phase at the age of 23. Though students can apply for the allowance at a later age, it is not possible 
to distinguish which students did so in the data set. To cancel out any students who already lost 
their right of basic allowance, the cut off is set at the age of 27. This way we account for all students 
that could have dealt with the intervention from 2010 onwards. This logic is illustrated in Table 
A1. 
Table A1. Age-academic year combinations in the treatment group.  
            
Academic year                       
2008/09       23 24 25 26 27 
2009/10      23 24 25 26 27 - 
2010/11     23 24 25 26 27 - - 
2011/12    23 24 25 26 27 - - - 
2012/13   23 24 25 26 27 - - - - 
2013/14  23 24 25 26 27 - - - - - 
2014/15 23 24 25 26 27 - - - - - - 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Full estimation results of the baseline regression model.  
                          
 
Student loan 
Parental transfers 
(in-cash) 
Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
             
Student loan    -0.55 *** 0.05 -0.08  0.07 0.36 *** 0.11 
             
Change in default -80.61 *** 4.05          
             
Age 17.85 *** 0.45 8.40 *** 0.98 19.34 *** 1.41 47.23 *** 2.21 
             
Male (0-1) -14.18 *** 1.72 0.03  1.76 -31.72 *** 2.53 -7.48 * 4.04 
             
Immigrant (0-1) 20.35 *** 2.83 -18.04 *** 2.83 -33.72 *** 4.06 -21.22 *** 6.28 
             
University (0-1) 17.42 *** 1.79 86.80 *** 1.89 -39.86 *** 2.70 49.69 *** 4.31 
             
Science (0-1) -44.04 *** 2.88 -19.69 *** 3.44 -30.08 *** 4.93 -30.30 *** 7.82 
             
Social science (0-1) -21.12 *** 3.05 -28.30 *** 3.05 39.06 *** 4.37 11.08  6.93 
             
Medical (0-1) -35.19 *** 3.03 -8.40 ** 3.32 -26.85 *** 4.75 -19.34 *** 6.93 
             
Economics (0-1) -26.97 *** 3.17 -13.08 *** 3.25 50.66 *** 4.65 10.08  7.42 
             
Law (0-1) -4.05  4.17 -16.10 *** 3.95 64.31 *** 5.66 -1.59  9.10 
             
Agriculture (0-1) -52.99 *** 3.63 -13.30 *** 4.27 -77.84 *** 6.11 -31.08 *** 9.98 
             
Education (0-1) -40.29 *** 4.58 -45.81 *** 4.74 20.34 *** 6.79 -38.01 *** 10.91 
             
Interdiscipl. (0-1) 1.23  9.79 71.42 *** 9.27 -41.74 *** 13.27 29.52  19.72 
             
Group (0-1) 143.51 *** 2.60 96.11 *** 5.86 58.61 *** 8.39 -74.18 *** 12.72 
             
Year 2006 (0-1) 17.25 *** 3.15 13.44 *** 3.11 11.55 *** 4.45 41.88 *** 7.88 
             
Year 2007 (0-1) 56.65 *** 3.60 41.99 *** 4.32 3.29  6.19 49.75 *** 10.26 
             
Year 2008 (0-1) 87.68 *** 4.11 47.12 *** 5.67 26.67 *** 8.12 71.44 *** 13.04 
             
Year 2009 (0-1) 81.76 *** 4.15 61.81 *** 5.48 52.40 *** 7.85 102.62 *** 12.62 
             
Year 2011 (0-1) -1.54  2.72 17.57 *** 2.59 -18.00 *** 3.71 -123.00 *** 6.88 
             
Year 2012 (0-1) 10.13 *** 3.43 17.23 *** 3.21 -14.76 *** 4.59 -135.35 *** 7.94 
             
Year 2013 (0-1) -5.29 * 2.91 25.32 *** 2.83 -53.09 *** 4.05 -172.80 *** 7.70 
             
Year 2014 (0-1) -3.25  3.18 4.26  3.04 -58.74 *** 4.36 -142.06 *** 8.17 
             
Year 2015 (0-1) 12.69 *** 2.98 7.54 *** 2.72 -40.21 *** 3.90 -186.09 *** 7.26 
             
Constant -268.26 *** 11.30 -53.25 *** 17.02 -112.02 *** 24.39 -330.51 *** 38.70 
                          
             
 
 
218.03 *** 0.55          
 
 
-0.03  0.05          
  
0.05  0.06          
 
 
0.50 *** 0.04          
 
 
295.65 *** 0.88          
 
 
0.22 *** 0.01          
 
 
-0.10 *** 0.02          
 
 
393.88 *** 1.68          
 
 
0.06 * 0.03          
 
 
206.46 *** 5.18          
                          
Observations 77,722   77,722   77,722   77,722   
F-stat. excl. 
instrument 
396.81 
           
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A3. Estimation results for students aged 22-23 only. 
                          
 
Student loan 
Parental transfers 
(in-cash) 
Earnings Spending 
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
             
Student loan    -0.57 *** 0.07 0.13  0.09 0.65 *** 0.16 
             
Change in default -97.8 *** 6.61          
                          
Observations 33,236   33,236   33,236   33,236   
F-stat. excl. 
instrument 
219.04 
           
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change in default,  
and sector of study dummies. Errors are allowed to be correlated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A4. Estimation results for different definitions of spending. Effect of student loan on parental transfers, earnings and 
student spending.  
                      
  Parental transfers Earnings Spending 
    Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.   S.E. 
           
In-cash + Student loan -0.62 *** 0.13 0.08  0.07 0.39 *** 0.11 
in-kind transfers           
           
In-cash + Student loan -0.55 *** 0.05 0.08  0.07 0.23 * 0.13 
in-kind spending           
           
In-cash spending Student loan -0.55 *** 0.05 0.08  0.07 0.34 * 0.10 
monthly + yearly (/12)           
                      
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Year dummies and control variables are included. Control variables include age, sex, immigrant, university, group that is subject to the change in default,  
and sector of study dummies. Errors are allowed to be correlated.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Average income sources for the treatment group (euros per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. 
Figure A2. Average income sources for the control group (euros per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. 
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Figure A3. Average student earnings for the treatment and control group over 2003-2015 (euros 
per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. 
Figure A4. Average parental contribution for the treatment and control group over 2003-2015 
(euros per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. 
 
Figure A5. Average student spending for the treatment and control group over 2005-2015 (euros 
per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. Spending is only available as from 2005. 
Figure A6. Average in-kind benefits from parents for the treatment and control group over 2005-
2015 (euros per month). 
 
Source: Studentenmonitor 2003-2015. The survey was not fielded in 2010. Spending is only available as from 2005. 
 
 
